Saturday, October 02, 2004
Tora Bora "Disaster"
http://www.indepundit.com/archive2/2004_election/ “So here’s my question for Senator Kerry, the armchair general (who served in Vietnam, don’t you know):
What would you have done differently in Afghanistan?
Presumably, he would have used American military forces, instead of “outsourcing” the effort to local warlords. But what forces where available in theater at the time? The first large contingent of conventional forces in Afghanistan, a brigade of 1,000 US Marines, arrived at an airstrip near Kandahar on November 25, 2001. That city, which had been the last stronghold of Taliban leader Omar, didn’t fall to anti-Taliban forces until December 7.
The only other US forces in Afghanistan at the time were Special Forces, and CIA paramilitaries. Their job was to help organize the various militias into a coherent force capable of defeating the Taliban, and to call in Coalition air strikes as required. It was this combination of Special Forces and local militia that had already driven the Taliban from the strategic city of Mazar-e-Sharif, the airbase at Bagram, and the capital Kabul.
The only US military on the ground at Tora Bora was a contingent of about two dozen Special Forces who were airlifted in to the area on December 2. Their mission was to coordinate the ground attack and to “laze” targets for US bombers. There is no way that these men could have taken Tora Bora without assistance – And the Marines in Kandahar already had their hands full. In any event, Tora Bora was completely overrun by December 12 – but not before the al Qaeda leadership escaped to Pakistan.”
Why trust an amateur military analyst such as Indepundit? What did real military analysts say about Tora Bora? Barry Posen M.I.T: “we missed a number of opportunities and the reason was that we didn’t want to take risks. Tora Bora was a disaster, universally acknowledged as such, and never explained. …. Using drones and a bunch of mercenaries and bombs in a cordon operation. We couldn’t have done a worse job.”
“Let’s make one thing clear: outside of this “outsourcing” plan, there would have been no significant military action in Afghanistan prior to November 25 – but by the time those first Marines arrived, the Taliban had already been largely defeated. “Outsourcing” the war in Afghanistan was not Bush’s idea. It was the Pentagon and the CIA that came up with this plan. But President Bush did approve it, and it worked.”
What, did I miss something? IT DID NOT WORK; Bin Laden and most of the Al Qaeda head cheeses escaped. The next time Bin Laden attacks the US, and make no mistake about it, he will, I want Americans to ask themselves whether they think the Rumsfailed’s outsourcing idea was a good one.
“The only military alternative to this plan would have been a massive invasion of Afghanistan with several heavy divisions. Of course, these divisions would have had to get to Afghanistan by coming ashore in Pakistan and driving through the ungoverned (and largely hostile) Tribal Areas, where the Pakistani army wouldn’t even go. In any event, it would have taken several more months for these forces to arrive in theater – plenty of time for the terrorists to dig in and prepare for the fight.”
This is perfect example of a rhetorical trick known as a false dilemma. There were more than two choices and what is more no one was talking about putting 3 Divisions into Afghanistan – no one. After the Tora Bora “disaster”, Posen calls it, the US quickly pumped in another couple of thousand troops. This only begs the question. Why if this was possible, did it take until November 25th for the first US deployment of any size to land in Afghanistan?
“Does anyone see any problems with this plan? It seems to me that the Russians tried this approach a while back, and the British before them. Both got their asses handed to them. Nevertheless, I’m sure that the Pentagon presented this option to Bush, with all of the caveats above. In my judgement, Bush was right to reject this plan, and go instead with the “outsourcing” approach.”
It seems to me that you are wrong. The Russians were trying to prop up a failing regime and not topple a government with virtually no tanks or aircraft. What the Russians tired to do is similar to what the Americans are trying to do in Iraq now. Some of the problems are the same too. One of the biggest problems for the Soviets was the number of Afghan troops and going to fight with the rebels whenever they were pressed into duty. Incidentally, comparing troop looses in Afghanistan and Iraq is misleading. America has always placed a far greater value on the lives of its soldiers than the Soviets and this is reflected in the tactics that they used and the emphasis they placed on providing care to wounded soldiers.
This favorite Bush bitch defense fails in two other ways: First, everyone and their uncle supplied the Afghan resistance with arms and training. No one was going to so arm the Tailban. Second, disease (malaria and Hep B) proved a far greater opponent than the Afghan resistance and accounted for the vast majority of Soviet casualties in Afghanistan. http://www.lewrockwell.com/elkins/elkins53.html Needless to say, while, disease is certainly an obstacle the US army must overcome it is not something that could cripple it.
http://www.indepundit.com/archive2/2004_election/ “So here’s my question for Senator Kerry, the armchair general (who served in Vietnam, don’t you know):
What would you have done differently in Afghanistan?
Presumably, he would have used American military forces, instead of “outsourcing” the effort to local warlords. But what forces where available in theater at the time? The first large contingent of conventional forces in Afghanistan, a brigade of 1,000 US Marines, arrived at an airstrip near Kandahar on November 25, 2001. That city, which had been the last stronghold of Taliban leader Omar, didn’t fall to anti-Taliban forces until December 7.
The only other US forces in Afghanistan at the time were Special Forces, and CIA paramilitaries. Their job was to help organize the various militias into a coherent force capable of defeating the Taliban, and to call in Coalition air strikes as required. It was this combination of Special Forces and local militia that had already driven the Taliban from the strategic city of Mazar-e-Sharif, the airbase at Bagram, and the capital Kabul.
The only US military on the ground at Tora Bora was a contingent of about two dozen Special Forces who were airlifted in to the area on December 2. Their mission was to coordinate the ground attack and to “laze” targets for US bombers. There is no way that these men could have taken Tora Bora without assistance – And the Marines in Kandahar already had their hands full. In any event, Tora Bora was completely overrun by December 12 – but not before the al Qaeda leadership escaped to Pakistan.”
Why trust an amateur military analyst such as Indepundit? What did real military analysts say about Tora Bora? Barry Posen M.I.T: “we missed a number of opportunities and the reason was that we didn’t want to take risks. Tora Bora was a disaster, universally acknowledged as such, and never explained. …. Using drones and a bunch of mercenaries and bombs in a cordon operation. We couldn’t have done a worse job.”
“Let’s make one thing clear: outside of this “outsourcing” plan, there would have been no significant military action in Afghanistan prior to November 25 – but by the time those first Marines arrived, the Taliban had already been largely defeated. “Outsourcing” the war in Afghanistan was not Bush’s idea. It was the Pentagon and the CIA that came up with this plan. But President Bush did approve it, and it worked.”
What, did I miss something? IT DID NOT WORK; Bin Laden and most of the Al Qaeda head cheeses escaped. The next time Bin Laden attacks the US, and make no mistake about it, he will, I want Americans to ask themselves whether they think the Rumsfailed’s outsourcing idea was a good one.
“The only military alternative to this plan would have been a massive invasion of Afghanistan with several heavy divisions. Of course, these divisions would have had to get to Afghanistan by coming ashore in Pakistan and driving through the ungoverned (and largely hostile) Tribal Areas, where the Pakistani army wouldn’t even go. In any event, it would have taken several more months for these forces to arrive in theater – plenty of time for the terrorists to dig in and prepare for the fight.”
This is perfect example of a rhetorical trick known as a false dilemma. There were more than two choices and what is more no one was talking about putting 3 Divisions into Afghanistan – no one. After the Tora Bora “disaster”, Posen calls it, the US quickly pumped in another couple of thousand troops. This only begs the question. Why if this was possible, did it take until November 25th for the first US deployment of any size to land in Afghanistan?
“Does anyone see any problems with this plan? It seems to me that the Russians tried this approach a while back, and the British before them. Both got their asses handed to them. Nevertheless, I’m sure that the Pentagon presented this option to Bush, with all of the caveats above. In my judgement, Bush was right to reject this plan, and go instead with the “outsourcing” approach.”
It seems to me that you are wrong. The Russians were trying to prop up a failing regime and not topple a government with virtually no tanks or aircraft. What the Russians tired to do is similar to what the Americans are trying to do in Iraq now. Some of the problems are the same too. One of the biggest problems for the Soviets was the number of Afghan troops and going to fight with the rebels whenever they were pressed into duty. Incidentally, comparing troop looses in Afghanistan and Iraq is misleading. America has always placed a far greater value on the lives of its soldiers than the Soviets and this is reflected in the tactics that they used and the emphasis they placed on providing care to wounded soldiers.
This favorite Bush bitch defense fails in two other ways: First, everyone and their uncle supplied the Afghan resistance with arms and training. No one was going to so arm the Tailban. Second, disease (malaria and Hep B) proved a far greater opponent than the Afghan resistance and accounted for the vast majority of Soviet casualties in Afghanistan. http://www.lewrockwell.com/elkins/elkins53.html Needless to say, while, disease is certainly an obstacle the US army must overcome it is not something that could cripple it.
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