Tuesday, April 06, 2004
Forcing Sadr's hand: A Gamble that Failed?
BBC has continually questioned the wisdom of closing down Sadr’s paper and arresting one of his top aids. Following the lead of the American press, they contend that Sadr is in the greater scheme of things a marginal figure and his paper was viewed as little more than a “tabloid”. By closing down the paper and arresting his aid, the Americans make Sadr seem more important than he truly is and more importantly they needlessly forced a show down with the cleric. Simply put, they are wrong.
As Juan Cole explains, the minimizing of Sadr by noting that he “only” has 10,000 militia is basically lying by omission. “In fact that is the size of his formal militia. Muqtada's movement is like the layers of an onion. You have 10,000 militiamen. But then you have tens of thousands of cadres able to mobilize neighborhoods. Then you have hundreds of thousands of Sadrists, followers of Muqtada and other heirs of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr. Then you have maybe 5 million Shiite theocrats [, a disproportionate number of whom are young males,] who sympathize with Muqtada's goals and rhetoric, about a third of the Shiite community.” Needless to say, if Cole is right this is sizable base of support.
Now, without knowing the papers circulation numbers etc, I will take the word of a recognized Iraqi Shiite expert and assume that the paper is as well received as the man.
As for the claim that the US had nothing to gain by forcing a show down with the cleric this is simply not true. Sadr city has been a hot bed of Anti US activity. Indeed, one US soldier notes that Sadr city “is where the most resistance can be find in Baghdad. In fact, the military pulled out of that area awhile ago because of the attacks. It is considered to be even a little more dangerous than Fallujah, but Fallujah is a big city, and Saddam City is a neighborhood.” http://bootsonground.blogspot.com/ Juan Cole also notes that given population breakdown and the way Shiites and Sunnis responded to a poll asking them whether they approve of the targeting of American troops, more Shiites than Sunnis approve of such measures. (1.6 million vs 1.2 million). While, he says that “the numbers bring into question the official line that there are no problems in the South, only in the Sunni Arab heartland.” the actual distribution of coalition causalities suggests that the official line is true, but the polls results are entirely consistent with the soldier’s observations and with there being a disproportionate number of those in Sadr city supporting such action.
In a country where saving face is extremely important, the US seems to have reasoned that given the current situation is a mess and the fact that a showdown with Sadr sometime down the road was all but inevitable, it was worth gambling that they could force Sadr to back down and in the process cause him to loose face with his followers. He called their bluff and now they have no choice but to kill him. Holding him for trail would be disastrous. The IGC has enough baggage as it is.
BBC has continually questioned the wisdom of closing down Sadr’s paper and arresting one of his top aids. Following the lead of the American press, they contend that Sadr is in the greater scheme of things a marginal figure and his paper was viewed as little more than a “tabloid”. By closing down the paper and arresting his aid, the Americans make Sadr seem more important than he truly is and more importantly they needlessly forced a show down with the cleric. Simply put, they are wrong.
As Juan Cole explains, the minimizing of Sadr by noting that he “only” has 10,000 militia is basically lying by omission. “In fact that is the size of his formal militia. Muqtada's movement is like the layers of an onion. You have 10,000 militiamen. But then you have tens of thousands of cadres able to mobilize neighborhoods. Then you have hundreds of thousands of Sadrists, followers of Muqtada and other heirs of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr. Then you have maybe 5 million Shiite theocrats [, a disproportionate number of whom are young males,] who sympathize with Muqtada's goals and rhetoric, about a third of the Shiite community.” Needless to say, if Cole is right this is sizable base of support.
Now, without knowing the papers circulation numbers etc, I will take the word of a recognized Iraqi Shiite expert and assume that the paper is as well received as the man.
As for the claim that the US had nothing to gain by forcing a show down with the cleric this is simply not true. Sadr city has been a hot bed of Anti US activity. Indeed, one US soldier notes that Sadr city “is where the most resistance can be find in Baghdad. In fact, the military pulled out of that area awhile ago because of the attacks. It is considered to be even a little more dangerous than Fallujah, but Fallujah is a big city, and Saddam City is a neighborhood.” http://bootsonground.blogspot.com/ Juan Cole also notes that given population breakdown and the way Shiites and Sunnis responded to a poll asking them whether they approve of the targeting of American troops, more Shiites than Sunnis approve of such measures. (1.6 million vs 1.2 million). While, he says that “the numbers bring into question the official line that there are no problems in the South, only in the Sunni Arab heartland.” the actual distribution of coalition causalities suggests that the official line is true, but the polls results are entirely consistent with the soldier’s observations and with there being a disproportionate number of those in Sadr city supporting such action.
In a country where saving face is extremely important, the US seems to have reasoned that given the current situation is a mess and the fact that a showdown with Sadr sometime down the road was all but inevitable, it was worth gambling that they could force Sadr to back down and in the process cause him to loose face with his followers. He called their bluff and now they have no choice but to kill him. Holding him for trail would be disastrous. The IGC has enough baggage as it is.
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