Saturday, April 10, 2004
Fallujah
Many pundits have said the US must be careful in Fallujah. The killing and injuring of civilians will only make the US more enemies there. Strictly speaking this is false. 70% of people inside the notorious Sunni triangle approve of attacks on US troops and of the remaining 30% it is a safe to assume that they are no fan of the Americans. The numbers in Fallujah are bound to be even worse, making it hard to see how the population there could be further mobilized against the US. That said, even if it was conceivable, this would make things easier for the Americans not more difficult. Indeed, the problem facing the US in Fallujah, as in everywhere else in Iraq, is that there is no clear line of demarcation between civilians and enemy combatants. The more Fallujahians that the Americans can provoke into joining the rebels, the clearer things become and the easier it is to crush them. From a US perspective, aggressive action has had the added benefit of driving women, children and the elderly out of town and so further clarifying things. Kurd and Shia rebels armed with RPGs and A47s were no match in pitched battle for Saddam’s aged T72 tanks and helicopter gun ships in 1991. Sunni and Shia rebels are even less of a match for Abrams tanks, AC 130 gun ships, laser guided bombs and apaches.
The pundits are right in two respects though. Letting loose in Fallujah does not play well in the rest of the Middle East. Encouraged by Arab rhetoric doubling as news, which suggest the Americans are targeting anything that moves, the “Arab street” is up in arms and the Arab rulers worried. (Some of the 4000 pound bombs the Americans dropped left craters that were thirty-five feet deep and sixty feet across. Even without resorting to carpet bombing of cities, something the US has not done since WW2 and something which resulted in more than a 100,000 on a few nights, it would be ridiculously easy for the Americans kill everyone in Fallujah if that is what they truly wanted. Allegedly, 400 Fallujahians have been killed so far. Far from revealing a massive American onslaught, this figure, which is likely too high, shows just how localized the fighting has been. As one American soldier said about the Fallujah operation, “we have to be very precise in our application of combat power. We cannot kill a lot of innocent folks (though they are few and far between in Fallujah).”)
The other major problem facing the US with regard to Fallujah is the IGC. Several IGC council members have threatened to resign for what they see as the Americans collectively punishing the citizens of Fallujah. Some do this for political reasons, others for seemingly personal ones. Opposition is not unique to the IGC. Some ministers have resigned, or threatened to resign.
Moving on, I still think the US will have little choice but to kill Sadr. However, there is no immediate need to subdue his militia. By kicking the crap out of anyone that does not adhere to their brand of fundamentalist Islam, they are doing a far better job of undercutting their message, at least outside of Sadr city, than the US ever could. Moreover, in contrast to Fallujah, aggressively targeting Sadr's forces really does have the potential for disaster.
Many pundits have said the US must be careful in Fallujah. The killing and injuring of civilians will only make the US more enemies there. Strictly speaking this is false. 70% of people inside the notorious Sunni triangle approve of attacks on US troops and of the remaining 30% it is a safe to assume that they are no fan of the Americans. The numbers in Fallujah are bound to be even worse, making it hard to see how the population there could be further mobilized against the US. That said, even if it was conceivable, this would make things easier for the Americans not more difficult. Indeed, the problem facing the US in Fallujah, as in everywhere else in Iraq, is that there is no clear line of demarcation between civilians and enemy combatants. The more Fallujahians that the Americans can provoke into joining the rebels, the clearer things become and the easier it is to crush them. From a US perspective, aggressive action has had the added benefit of driving women, children and the elderly out of town and so further clarifying things. Kurd and Shia rebels armed with RPGs and A47s were no match in pitched battle for Saddam’s aged T72 tanks and helicopter gun ships in 1991. Sunni and Shia rebels are even less of a match for Abrams tanks, AC 130 gun ships, laser guided bombs and apaches.
The pundits are right in two respects though. Letting loose in Fallujah does not play well in the rest of the Middle East. Encouraged by Arab rhetoric doubling as news, which suggest the Americans are targeting anything that moves, the “Arab street” is up in arms and the Arab rulers worried. (Some of the 4000 pound bombs the Americans dropped left craters that were thirty-five feet deep and sixty feet across. Even without resorting to carpet bombing of cities, something the US has not done since WW2 and something which resulted in more than a 100,000 on a few nights, it would be ridiculously easy for the Americans kill everyone in Fallujah if that is what they truly wanted. Allegedly, 400 Fallujahians have been killed so far. Far from revealing a massive American onslaught, this figure, which is likely too high, shows just how localized the fighting has been. As one American soldier said about the Fallujah operation, “we have to be very precise in our application of combat power. We cannot kill a lot of innocent folks (though they are few and far between in Fallujah).”)
The other major problem facing the US with regard to Fallujah is the IGC. Several IGC council members have threatened to resign for what they see as the Americans collectively punishing the citizens of Fallujah. Some do this for political reasons, others for seemingly personal ones. Opposition is not unique to the IGC. Some ministers have resigned, or threatened to resign.
Moving on, I still think the US will have little choice but to kill Sadr. However, there is no immediate need to subdue his militia. By kicking the crap out of anyone that does not adhere to their brand of fundamentalist Islam, they are doing a far better job of undercutting their message, at least outside of Sadr city, than the US ever could. Moreover, in contrast to Fallujah, aggressively targeting Sadr's forces really does have the potential for disaster.
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