Friday, December 12, 2003
I wrote the following letter to a friend. It deals with US support for Iraq during the Iran Iraq war.
"I hear people liken the relationship the US had with Iraq during the Iran Iraq war to the relationship the US had with the Soviets in WW2. In making the comparison, they invariably trot out the maxim that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The fact of the matter is that things were much more complicated.
A key error people make in commenting on the situation is that the US’s sparring partner was not, as it is now, Islamic extremism. It was, rather, the Soviet Union. Hence, although one of the US’s goals was to contain Iran and weaken the leadership there, its primary aim was to increase its economic and political presence in region at expense of the Soviet Union. In so doing, they sought not only to strike at the Soviets, but also to secure long term access to the region’s oil.
Of course, sometimes these two goals were not compatible and all cases they choose to pursue the latter goal rather than the former. Take the role the US played in solidifying the rule of the mullahs. Opposition to the Shah had of course come from a broad cross selection of society and to a call it an Islamic revolution is somewhat misleading. However, the Mullahs held the upper hand by the time the war broke out and as war progressed, the Iranian people began to rally around their rule. So what did the US do? While according to the Tower Commission, "in 1983, the United States helped bring to the attention of Teheran the threat inherent in the extensive infiltration of the government by the communist Tudeh Party and Soviet or pro-Soviet cadres in the country. Using this information, the Khomeini government took measures, including mass executions, which virtually eliminated the pro-Soviet infrastructure in Iran [and all real resistance to the Mullahs.]" To insure that the Iranians went the extra mile, the US passed on both "real and deceptive intelligence" about Soviet troops movements near the Iranian border. All the while, US officials expressed public concern for those purged.
Once the purge was complete, the US sought to engage Iran by selling it weapons. This is not as strange as it first seems. Even as Iran funded Hezbollah attacks on its soldiers in Lebanon, the Israelis were busily supplying Iran with arms and it was the Israelis that the Americans ended up using as a middle man. As far as Iran was concerned, there some very practical benefits of dealing with the US. Namely, it did not have the same access to arms on the open market as Iraq and most of its equipment was American, from when the Shah was in power, and so was in need of American parts.
Now, one of the reasons Iran’s access to the arms market was limited was that the US had launched “Operation Staunch” the year before. Supposedly worried about Iranian military gains and wanting to secure its relationship with Baghdad established earlier that year, the US put pressure on its Western allies put not to sell arms to Iran as set forth in the 1980 embargo. Needless to say, planned, or not Staunch helped grease the wheels of the Iran Contra deals.
Anyway, the amount and quality of arms the US supplied gave the Iranians increased offensive capability and the intelligence supplied it was significant. For example, as CIA deputy director McMahon, stated at the Tower commission, he had warned Poindexter that some of the intelligence passed to the Iranians would give them “a definite edge” with potentially “cataclysmic results”. However, neither Poindexter nor CIA Director Casey headed McMahon’s warnings and American intelligence helped secure a victory for the Iranians on the Fao Peninsula.
The cynic in me believes that these warnings were ignored for good reason. For as the Iran contra thing was going on and Iranian battle field success mounted, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia sought the protection of the US. It was during this time that Saudi Arabia agreed to allow the use to use its territory in a time of crisis.
At rate, the whole meticulous plan came crashing down when the Iranians leaked that the US was using Israel to supply them with arms. It was at this time, and everyone agrees on this, that the Americans tilted heavily in favor Iraq. It was also after that time that the US began supplying Iraq with the means of making more chemical weapons. Even that idiot, McDonald picked up on this. “Let us … go back to 1987,… when corporations employed influential board members like Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld to sell materials for chemical warfare …. They were selling them to Hussein, who was at the peak of his murdering days and the darling ally of the U.S.”
This was not the only thing that the US did. In September of 1986, before the scandal broke, the Kuwaitis approached both Washington and Moscow and asked if they would be interested in reflagging some Kuwaiti vessels. The initial U.S. reaction was lackadaisical. Attacks on shipping had not slowed down the flow of oil (world oil prices had dropped 50% since the start of the war) and besides reflagging the ships might upset a balance that existed between the Iraqis and the Iranians. However, when the Soviet Union offered to reflag eleven tankers in March of 1987, the US promptly offered to reflag the same eleven ships. In so doing they hopped to stick it in the eye of the soviets and at the same time show both support for the Gulf States and Iraq.
The US reasons for orginally not wanting to reflag the ships were warranted. The, so called, tanker War expanded significantly. Between 1981 and April 1987, when the U.S. reflagging was announced, Iran struck 90 ships; in the subsequent 15 months, Iran struck 126 ships. It was also during this time that an Iraqi plane attacked the USS Stark and the USS Vincennes downed an Iranian jet liner. (One of the guys at the pub (Older, Middle Eastern guy doing MA in Political Science) maintained that the downing the air liner was no accident. He said the Iranian commercial traffic had ignored restrictions the US had placed on air traffic following the Stark incident. So, to prove they meant business, they shot the thing out of the sky without warning. They claimed that mistook it for fighter jet, but he said this was a lie. Before, you ask, no he was not the least bit of offended by this and in fact took a certain delight in the policy. He told me the story several times.)
So to answer your assertion about the US supporting Iraq during the Iran Iraq war, I will have to say yes and no. After 1987 they did and Saddam came out of the war stronger as a result, but before then no. Before then they had supplied the Iranians far more arms than they did the Iraqis. That being said, the real consequences of what they did during the War was that the establishment of much larger political and economic footprint in the region during this time helped give ammunition to the fruit loops returning from Afghanistan and for the fruit loops already in the region. Another important consequence was that US actions helped solidify the rule of the Mullahs in Iran.
By the way, there is a strange twist to story how the US actually gained basing rights in Saudi Arabia. Following the invasion of Iraq, Iraq placed some divisions on the Saudi border. This made the Saudis and indeed the whole Arab League extremely nervous. The Saudis then invited the Americans in and thus began Operation Desert Shield. What the CIA learned later though was that the Iraqis did not have any plans to invade Saudi Arabia. They thought that by placing troops on the border that this would deter anyone from attacking Iraqi controlled Kuwait."
"I hear people liken the relationship the US had with Iraq during the Iran Iraq war to the relationship the US had with the Soviets in WW2. In making the comparison, they invariably trot out the maxim that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The fact of the matter is that things were much more complicated.
A key error people make in commenting on the situation is that the US’s sparring partner was not, as it is now, Islamic extremism. It was, rather, the Soviet Union. Hence, although one of the US’s goals was to contain Iran and weaken the leadership there, its primary aim was to increase its economic and political presence in region at expense of the Soviet Union. In so doing, they sought not only to strike at the Soviets, but also to secure long term access to the region’s oil.
Of course, sometimes these two goals were not compatible and all cases they choose to pursue the latter goal rather than the former. Take the role the US played in solidifying the rule of the mullahs. Opposition to the Shah had of course come from a broad cross selection of society and to a call it an Islamic revolution is somewhat misleading. However, the Mullahs held the upper hand by the time the war broke out and as war progressed, the Iranian people began to rally around their rule. So what did the US do? While according to the Tower Commission, "in 1983, the United States helped bring to the attention of Teheran the threat inherent in the extensive infiltration of the government by the communist Tudeh Party and Soviet or pro-Soviet cadres in the country. Using this information, the Khomeini government took measures, including mass executions, which virtually eliminated the pro-Soviet infrastructure in Iran [and all real resistance to the Mullahs.]" To insure that the Iranians went the extra mile, the US passed on both "real and deceptive intelligence" about Soviet troops movements near the Iranian border. All the while, US officials expressed public concern for those purged.
Once the purge was complete, the US sought to engage Iran by selling it weapons. This is not as strange as it first seems. Even as Iran funded Hezbollah attacks on its soldiers in Lebanon, the Israelis were busily supplying Iran with arms and it was the Israelis that the Americans ended up using as a middle man. As far as Iran was concerned, there some very practical benefits of dealing with the US. Namely, it did not have the same access to arms on the open market as Iraq and most of its equipment was American, from when the Shah was in power, and so was in need of American parts.
Now, one of the reasons Iran’s access to the arms market was limited was that the US had launched “Operation Staunch” the year before. Supposedly worried about Iranian military gains and wanting to secure its relationship with Baghdad established earlier that year, the US put pressure on its Western allies put not to sell arms to Iran as set forth in the 1980 embargo. Needless to say, planned, or not Staunch helped grease the wheels of the Iran Contra deals.
Anyway, the amount and quality of arms the US supplied gave the Iranians increased offensive capability and the intelligence supplied it was significant. For example, as CIA deputy director McMahon, stated at the Tower commission, he had warned Poindexter that some of the intelligence passed to the Iranians would give them “a definite edge” with potentially “cataclysmic results”. However, neither Poindexter nor CIA Director Casey headed McMahon’s warnings and American intelligence helped secure a victory for the Iranians on the Fao Peninsula.
The cynic in me believes that these warnings were ignored for good reason. For as the Iran contra thing was going on and Iranian battle field success mounted, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia sought the protection of the US. It was during this time that Saudi Arabia agreed to allow the use to use its territory in a time of crisis.
At rate, the whole meticulous plan came crashing down when the Iranians leaked that the US was using Israel to supply them with arms. It was at this time, and everyone agrees on this, that the Americans tilted heavily in favor Iraq. It was also after that time that the US began supplying Iraq with the means of making more chemical weapons. Even that idiot, McDonald picked up on this. “Let us … go back to 1987,… when corporations employed influential board members like Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld to sell materials for chemical warfare …. They were selling them to Hussein, who was at the peak of his murdering days and the darling ally of the U.S.”
This was not the only thing that the US did. In September of 1986, before the scandal broke, the Kuwaitis approached both Washington and Moscow and asked if they would be interested in reflagging some Kuwaiti vessels. The initial U.S. reaction was lackadaisical. Attacks on shipping had not slowed down the flow of oil (world oil prices had dropped 50% since the start of the war) and besides reflagging the ships might upset a balance that existed between the Iraqis and the Iranians. However, when the Soviet Union offered to reflag eleven tankers in March of 1987, the US promptly offered to reflag the same eleven ships. In so doing they hopped to stick it in the eye of the soviets and at the same time show both support for the Gulf States and Iraq.
The US reasons for orginally not wanting to reflag the ships were warranted. The, so called, tanker War expanded significantly. Between 1981 and April 1987, when the U.S. reflagging was announced, Iran struck 90 ships; in the subsequent 15 months, Iran struck 126 ships. It was also during this time that an Iraqi plane attacked the USS Stark and the USS Vincennes downed an Iranian jet liner. (One of the guys at the pub (Older, Middle Eastern guy doing MA in Political Science) maintained that the downing the air liner was no accident. He said the Iranian commercial traffic had ignored restrictions the US had placed on air traffic following the Stark incident. So, to prove they meant business, they shot the thing out of the sky without warning. They claimed that mistook it for fighter jet, but he said this was a lie. Before, you ask, no he was not the least bit of offended by this and in fact took a certain delight in the policy. He told me the story several times.)
So to answer your assertion about the US supporting Iraq during the Iran Iraq war, I will have to say yes and no. After 1987 they did and Saddam came out of the war stronger as a result, but before then no. Before then they had supplied the Iranians far more arms than they did the Iraqis. That being said, the real consequences of what they did during the War was that the establishment of much larger political and economic footprint in the region during this time helped give ammunition to the fruit loops returning from Afghanistan and for the fruit loops already in the region. Another important consequence was that US actions helped solidify the rule of the Mullahs in Iran.
By the way, there is a strange twist to story how the US actually gained basing rights in Saudi Arabia. Following the invasion of Iraq, Iraq placed some divisions on the Saudi border. This made the Saudis and indeed the whole Arab League extremely nervous. The Saudis then invited the Americans in and thus began Operation Desert Shield. What the CIA learned later though was that the Iraqis did not have any plans to invade Saudi Arabia. They thought that by placing troops on the border that this would deter anyone from attacking Iraqi controlled Kuwait."
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